By Gregory Lobo
A decade ago, the Colombian electorate was presented with a binary choice that would define the nation’s trajectory for generations: “Do you support the final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace?” The result of the 2016 plebiscite sent a shockwave through the political establishment, as a narrow majority—50.2%—rejected the deal brokered by the administration of Juan Manuel Santos. Today, that echoes of that neglected mandate have returned with renewed force, framing a seismic shift in the country’s political landscape.
The 2016 Plebiscite: A Mandate Ignored
The 2016 plebiscite was designed by the Santos administration as the ultimate seal of legitimacy for the peace process with the FARC guerrillas. However, when the "No" vote triumphed, the government faced an existential crisis regarding its democratic credentials.
Despite the explicit rejection by the electorate, the administration moved to bypass the popular will. By implementing minimal, largely cosmetic changes to the text, the government took the agreement to Congress—a body traditionally more susceptible to executive influence—where it was ratified. Parties that had campaigned for the "No" boycotted the session, allowing the government to claim a unanimous approval among those present. This maneuver, while technically constitutional, left a deep scar on the body politic, fostering a perception that the elite had successfully sidelined the people’s voice under the guise of legalism.
The Historical Precedent of Disenfranchisement
This tension between institutional power and the "sovereign people" is not new to Colombia. Historians often point to the Pact of Union of 1861 and the Constitution of Rionegro in 1863, both of which invoked the doctrine of popular sovereignty as their primary source of legitimacy. Yet, in practice, these documents frequently criminalized popular uprisings or dissent as acts of sedition. While the 1991 Constitution sought to modernize this relationship, the political class has consistently demonstrated a tendency to treat the popular mandate as a secondary concern, prioritizing procedural consensus over the genuine will of the citizenry.
Chronology of a Failing Peace
The "peace" promised by the 2016 accords has, by many metrics, failed to materialize in the decade that followed.
- 2016: The plebiscite rejects the peace deal; the government proceeds with congressional approval.
- 2017-2018: Thousands of FARC combatants demobilize under UN supervision, yet significant splinter groups remain active.
- 2019-2022: A period of "re-armament" begins as former combatants return to illegal activities, and new criminal organizations (GAOs) fill the power vacuums left by the FARC.
- 2024: Colombia records its highest number of annual homicides since 2015, signaling a total collapse of the security gains expected from the peace process.
- 2025: The failure of ongoing "Total Peace" negotiations with current criminal actors triggers a national backlash, culminating in the electoral victory of Abelardo De La Espriella.
The "peace" achieved in 2016 was akin to a political utopia—always promised to be just around the corner, yet perpetually deferred by the complexities of reality. The vacuum left by the FARC was not replaced by the state, but by a hydra of criminal enterprises that continue to dominate vast swaths of the national territory.
Supporting Data: The Security Crisis
The empirical evidence regarding the post-2016 security environment is stark. The fragmentation of the FARC did not lead to total demobilization but to the democratization of violence. Where one monolithic organization once existed, dozens of smaller, more predatory groups have emerged.
According to recent internal security reports, the territorial control exerted by these groups has crippled the development of the formal economy. In regions such as the Cauca, Chocó, and the border areas with Venezuela, the state remains an absent entity. The failure to secure these territories has forced millions of citizens to live under the de facto rule of criminal syndicates, rendering the concept of "citizen rights" effectively void. The rise in homicides is not merely a statistical anomaly; it is a symptom of a systemic policy failure that prioritized dialogue with combatants over the restoration of law and order for the civilian population.
The June 21st Electoral Shift
On June 21, 2026, the Colombian electorate spoke with unprecedented volume. Abelardo De La Espriella secured the presidency with nearly 13 million votes—the highest tally in the nation’s democratic history.
De La Espriella’s platform was, by contrast, radical in its clarity: he pledged to abandon the cycle of endless negotiations with criminal organizations and instead pursue their definitive military defeat. The election results reflect a nation divided, mirroring the razor-thin margins of the 2016 plebiscite, yet the mandate is fundamentally different. Voters did not choose a continuation of the status quo; they chose a rejection of the negotiation paradigm.
Why the People Voted
The factors driving the 2026 result were multifaceted:
- Security Fatigue: The primary driver was the exhaustion caused by the deteriorating security situation.
- Economic Instability: High inflation and the perceived mismanagement of the economy under the previous administration fueled a desire for radical change.
- Ideological Divergence: A growing rejection of the "Total Peace" doctrine, which many voters felt emboldened criminal actors rather than pacifying them.
- The "Macondo" Disillusionment: A profound skepticism toward the political rhetoric that suggested words alone could replace the rule of law in a country plagued by violence.
Implications for the Future of Colombia
The victory of De La Espriella serves as a definitive "No" to the failed policies of the past decade. It represents a massive, amplified, and united rejection of the notion that the state should negotiate its sovereignty with groups that operate outside the law.
The Challenge of Implementation
While the election provides a clear mandate, the practical implementation of a "military-first" approach carries significant risks. The international community, largely invested in the previous peace models, may adopt a cautious or critical stance. Furthermore, the institutional state in Colombia must be capable of asserting control over the vast territories previously ceded to illegal groups—a task that requires more than just military force; it requires the restoration of justice, infrastructure, and economic opportunity.
The Return of the Sovereign Will
The most critical implication of this shift is the re-centering of the Colombian citizen as the protagonist of the peace process. For ten years, the voice of the people was marginalized, treated as an obstacle to be navigated rather than a mandate to be followed. By voting for a candidate who explicitly promised to end the cycle of negotiations, the Colombian people have asserted that the definition of "peace" belongs to them, not to the political elites or the armed groups.
As the new administration prepares to take the helm, the message from the ballot box is unmistakable: the era of "peace through negotiation" has reached its sunset. The nation is now embarking on a path that prioritizes the restoration of order and the protection of the civil society. Whether this approach succeeds where the previous one failed remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: the era of ignoring the popular will has come to a definitive end. The people, in their overwhelming majority, have decided that their survival as a society depends on the state’s willingness to defend the peace, not merely bargain for it.
